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Of the many gaps in the scheme of federal law, few have so vexed
the federal judiciary as those that result when Congress creates a federal
cause of action but fails to specify a period of limitations to govern the
timeliness of the suit.' Such congressional omissions have occurred with
monotonous regularity and frequently confound the judicial branch: The
federal courts have struggled in recent years to supply the measures of
timeliness that Congress left out of the civil rights laws of 1871,2 the
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1. See Federal Courts Study Comninee hnplenentanoin Act and Citnl Jusice Reform Act Hearing5
on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before tire Subcomm. on Courts. Itellectual Propert). and the Ad,,unmt~ranon
of Justice of the House Cotton. on the Judiciary' 101st Cong 146 (1990) Ihereinafter Heanngs l (statement
of Deanell R. Tacha, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit) ("l think that I can safely
speak on behalf of all Federal judges in the Nation who have groped for the appropnate State statute o1
limitations to apply. I, the Judicial Conference, and most of the judges I know, support the proposal that
a Federal statute of limitations be provided for laws which do not other, ise provide a statute ol
limitations."); see also Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guar Co. 805 F2d 741. 747 (7th Citr 1986)
(Ripple, J., dissenting) (decrying the "'tedious" process of borrowing a gapfiller Irom state law), sucated.
483 U.S. 1015 (1987).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1994) Courts borrow state law' to govern the timehiness o §
1983 claims under the influence of § 1988, which provides for the determination ot claims under the cisil
rights statutes "in conformity with the laws of the United States" and, in cases %,'herc those laws do not
speak, in accordance with "the common law . and statutes of the State so tar as the same is not
inconsistent with" federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) The Court has made an ellort to develop a
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securities law of 1934,3 and the plant closing legislation of 1988.' Such
judicial struggles reflect in part the amorphous nature of the gapfilling process.
Under the standard learning, federal courts supply omitted time limits by
borrowing the most analogous statute of limitations from state law.' When, as
often happens, a good many analogous state statutes present themselves,
federal judges must make a choice from among plausible alternatives.6 Judges
understandably chafe under the burden of choosing statutes of limitations,
particularly in light of the judicial perception that Congress ought to assume
primary responsibility for fixing limitations periods.7
Judicial efforts to shift the task of setting limits to Congress culminated in
the 1990 report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, recommending that
Congress establish particular time limits for all existing federal causes of
action.8 Although Congress responded in part with the passage of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, 9 the provision dealing with limitations periods
workable limitations period for § 1983 claims. Compare Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1985)
(resolving a conflict among the lower federal courts over the proper characterization of civil rights claims
arising under § 1983 and holding that federal courts should borrow the most analogous state limitations
period for personal injury claims), with Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (resolving at further
division over which personal injury limitations period to apply to § 1983 claims and establishing a
presumption in favor of the state's fallback or "residual" statute of limitations).
3. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781 (1994); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361 (1991) (applying a limitations period drawn from
federal securities laws as the measure of the timeliness of the implied private right of action for insider
trading).
4. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2119 (1994);
see also North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995) (resolving a circuit split by borrowing
state limitations periods as the measure of the timeliness of claims arising under the WARN Act)
5. See North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34 (describing the practice of relying upon state law as the
primary source of borrowed limitations periods for federal rights of action as "longstanding" and "settled"
(quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987); Wilson, 471 U.S.
at 266).
6. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring)
(identifying eight factors that might inform the choice of limitations periods and characterizing the process
as an exercise of"standardless, discretionary judgment" that defies predictability and necessitates litigation).
7. See Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple, J..
dissenting) (declaring that "Illixing the statute of limitation for a particular cause of action is t legislative
function"), vacated, 483 U.S. 1115 (1987); vlloviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d
Cir. 1961) (maintaining that the "selection of a period of years lis notl the kind of thing judges do"); .%ee
also Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 248 (5th Cir. 1994) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the process of borrowing as "so tenuous in foundation it appears as but an academic
exercise"), vacated, 56 F.3d 27 (1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 698 (1996); Short, 908 F2d at 1393 (Posner, J.,
concurring) (likening the borrowing process to determining "which round peg to stuff in a square hole").
8. See THE FED. CouRTs STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONHERENC' ofl- TH. U.S., RitWoRT OF THFE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 93 (1990) Ihereinafter RE'oRTj. Congress created the Federal Courts
Study Committee in legislation adopted in 1988 and directed it to study and report on such matters as
alternative dispute resolution, the resolution of conllicts in judicial authority, and federal court structure and
administration. See id. at 31. Members of the Committee, appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States in December 1988, included representatives from the three branches of the federal government and
from state governments, universities, and private legal practice. See id.
9. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1994)).
The residual federal limitations period now codified in title 28 appears in one part of that Act, known as
the Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650. tit. Ill, § 313(a), 14 Stat. 5104, 5114-15 (199)) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1658).
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stopped well short of the recommendation. Now codified as § 1658 of title 28,
the relevant provision simply states, "Except as otherwise provided by law, a
civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of
enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the
cause of action accrues."' Section 1658 thus establishes a fallback or residual
limitations period for claims arising under statutes enacted after December 1,
1990," but remains silent as to what periods of limitation should govern the
more than two hundred express and implied rights of action arising under
statutes already in existence on the date of the legislation (i.e., preenactment
federal statutes).
2
Judges and academic commentators generally view § 1658's silence about
the timeliness of claims arising under such preenactment statutes as a serious
gap in the new law. Federal judges who testified before the House
Subcommittee recognized that § 1658 does not directly address the period of
limitations for the "myriad" of existing federal rights of action; they criticized
what they saw as Congress's decision to force judges to "continue to -rope""
for an analogous state limitations period to borrow. Leading academic accounts
of the section agree with this judicial criticism," portraying Congress as
having failed to discharge its legislative function and arguing for further
legislation to fill the gap in § 1658.'5 The decisional law points in the same
direction: Federal courts that have faced such questions since 1990 have
generally continued to determine the timeliness of claims arising under
preenactment statutes by following the established state law borrowing mode;
the courts have uniformly rejected arguments for reliance on the four-year
limitations period of § 1658 as an appropriate measure of the timeliness of
such existing rights of action. 6
i0. 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
11. See id.
12. Following the passage of § 1658, the stall of the House Sub,.ommittee asked the National Li'
Center of the George Washington University to conduct a sure% of existing federal limitations la', and
recommend legislation to close the gap left by § 1658 Professor Peter Rasen-Hansen conduted the sure,
in question and proposed a four-year statute of limitations to gosem all existing ledcal tlatrn!, See Peter
Raven-Hansen, The Federal Statute ol Limitations Act of 1992 (Feb 14. 1992) iunpublished manusript.
on file with authors). Among other things, Raven-Hansen's study identifies oer 5W0 expeme and implied
rights of acuon, only about 350 of which are limited by specific statutes of limitation See id at 3
13. Hearings, supra note I, at 146 (statement of Deanell R Tacha. Cirmuit Judge, U S Coun of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit); 3ee also id. at 92 (statement of Joseph F Weis. Jr. Senior Circuit Judge.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit) (expressing hope that adoption of the partial solution proposed
by the House Committee would not derail congressional revicv of existing limitations prublcms and
characterizing recourse to state limitations periods as gaplillers as "a generall. 'astelul exercise"i
14. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, 28 U.S C § 1658- A Lnitatton Periol it h Real Lmutatum. 69
IND. L.J. 477 (1994); aee alao Kathanne F Nelson. The 1990 Federal "Fallback " Statute of LimtatIII01
Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REv 454 (1993). NI Patrick McDov\ell. Note, Lnnation Periodh for
Federal Causes of Action After the Judicial hnprotenent3 Act of 1990. 44 VA N) L RIA' 1355 i 19 )l
15. See Norwood, supra note 14, at 503-08. 517-1, .ee abo Nelson. supra note 14. at 505-07. 514
(criticizing Congress's failure to address the timeltness of rights of action existin as of Dcecmbr 199")
and urging further legtslation to address the problem), McDov'ell. 3upra note 14. at 135S-59 isamei
16. The federal courts have refused to apply § 1658's lour-year limitations period to uaims arising
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In this Essay, we contend that § 1658 may go further to solve the problem
of the timeliness of federal claims than others have assumed. Although the
statute does not by its terms establish a limitations period for claims arising
under preenactment federal statutes, federal courts can reliably exercise their
common-lawmaking powers to borrow the four-year residual period of § 1658
as the limitations period for many such claims. Congress did not freeze in
place a regime of state law borrowing. Rather, Congress left the selection of
judge-made limitations periods to the flexible process of making federal
common law. Federal courts should modify the relevant body of federal
common law to establish a rule of presumptive reliance on periods drawn from
federal law. In particular, federal courts should seriously consider borrowing
the § 1658 four-year limitations period for most claims arising under
preenactment federal statutes as to which no clear rule of federal law has
emerged.
We present our position in two parts. Part I proposes an alternative to the
standard critique of § 1658. Instead of chiding Congress for having failed fully
to implement the recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee,
Part I focuses on what Congress did accomplish in the face of obstacles that
might have made a full legislative response difficult. In particular, Part I
contends that the array of likely interest group opposition to legislation
proposing to alter established limitations periods would have made the statute
far more difficult to enact, particularly in the time available. This part
concludes that § 1658 makes a variety of important (and largely overlooked)
under statutes in effect as of December 1990; instead, they have borrowed from other sources. See
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F.3d 658, 661 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting
that § 1658 does not apply to claims arising under the Tennessee Valley Act, a federal statute that was
already in place as of § 1658's effective date in December 1990); Providence Sch. Dep't v. Ana C., 108
F.3d 1, 1 n.l (Ist Cir. 1997) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Barajas v. Bermudez, 43 F3d
1251, 1255 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act); Dell v. Board
of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1058 n. Il (7th Cir. 1994) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Wolsky
v. Medical College, I F.3d 222, 223 (4th Cir. 1993) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Shanahan v. Board of
Educ., 953 F. Supp. 440, 442 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 n.4 (D.N.H. 1995) (Americans with Disabilities Act);
see also Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply the four-year period
of § 1658 on the ground that the claim in question arose under a statute already in effect as of December
1990 and borrowing a state law limitations period instead); Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d
224, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying the federal six-month limitations period instead), vacated, 56 F.3d
27 (1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 698 (1996); Hickey v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th Cir.
1992) (applying the state law period instead); Middleton v. Russell Group, Ltd., 924 F. Supp. 48, 51-52
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (rejecting the argument for the application of § 1658 to a claim under ERISA and
applying state law instead); Curtis K. v. Sioux City Community Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1197, 1220-21
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (recognizing that § 1658 does not control the timeliness of claims arising under a
preenactment statute but drawing support for the selection of a relatively longer state limitations period
from the "duration and rationale" of § 1658); cf. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 363-64 & n.10 (1991) (dismissing § 1658 as "obviously" inapplicable to claims that both
accrued before December 1990 and arose under statutes then on the books); Siniscalchi v. Shop-Rite
Supermarkets, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 182, 188-89 & n.5 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that § 1658 does not apply
directly to statutes enacted before 1990 but nonetheless suggesting a possible application of the statute to
such claims). For the Supreme Court's most recent teaching on the subject, reaffirming the primacy of
limitations periods borrowed from state law, see North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995).
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contributions to our law of federal limitations, contributions that more than
adequately vindicate the congressional decision to refrain from taking up
thorny timeliness questions concerning preenactment statutes.
Part II turns to consider the process by which federal courts should fashion
judge-made limitations periods in the wake of the adoption of § 1658. After
criticizing the current regime of state law borrowing, this part argues for a shift
to presumptive reliance on uniform federal limitations periods. In particular,
this part suggests reliance on the four-year limitation of § 1658-a default
provision that would work for most outstanding issues. Such an approach, we
emphasize, rests entirely on the federal courts' retained power to fashion
federal common law and not on a claim that Congress itself extended the four-
year period to claims under preenactment statutes. We thus base our argument
on the model of retained federal common-lawmaking authority practiced in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.' 7 and not on any argument from
legislative intent.
We do not understand Congress to have foreclosed this approach. Credible
legislative history suggests that the congressional rejection of retroactivity
meant to preclude only the reopening of those periods that had been fixed with
relative certainty as of 1990. As to the remainder of unsettled issues, Congress
understood that the process of fashioning federal common law ought to
continue. While Congress meant to preserve settled limitations periods by
limiting the reach of its residual statute, it did nothing to require the federal
courts to apply state law limitations periods to other, unsettled, settings. In
other words, federal courts should not view the legislation as a directive to
borrow state law to solve all limitations problems.
I. RETHINKING THE STANDARD CRITIQUE OF § 1658
A. The Standard Critique of § 1658
Section 1658 grew out of dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's rule of
routine reliance upon state law to provide the measure of the timeliness of
federal rights of action.'" Following years of academic and judicial criticism
of the state law borrowing regime,' 9 the Federal Courts Study Committee
recommended abolition of borrowing. 2° In its place, the Study Committee
recommended that Congress specify the following: a particular limitations
17. 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (holding that enactment by Congress of specific wrongful death statutes for
maritime deaths did not displace the Court's retained power to overrule the well-established judgc-made
rule barring recovery of tort damages for injuries resulting in death)
18. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text
19. For effective criticisms of the state law borrowing regime, see Nelson. supra note 14. at 466-86.
and Norwood, supra note 14, at 480-502.
20. See REPORT, supra note 8.
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period to govern every new federal right of action that it legislates into
existence, particular limitations periods to govern the rights of action already
on the books as to which it had failed to specify limitations periods, and a
fallback limitations period that would govern the timeliness of any actions for
which it failed to set a particular period.2' In arguing for such new legislation,
the Study Committee cited a variety of familiar concerns, including the
difficulty of the task of judicial borrowing, the lack of certainty and
predictability, and the incentives for forum shopping.
22
Section 1658 appeared shortly after the Study Committee published its
final report in April 1990 and owes much to the efforts of Representative Bob
Kastenmeier of Wisconsin. Kastenmeier served both as a member of the Study
Committee and as chair of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice, the Subcommittee that took
responsibility for drafting legislation to implement the report.23 Kastenmeier
worked with his staff to cull from the committee's recommendations those
suggestions that, as he later described the process in his opening remarks at the
hearing on. the bill, would prove the easiest to enact and the most
"noncontroversial. 2 4 Little time remained before Congress adjourned, ending
the 101st Congress, and only the least controversial provisions would clear the
House in time to join provisions in a Senate bill that was expected to appear
before the end of the session in October2
Reflecting the goals of avoiding controversy and moving quickly, section
112 of the bill dealt with the problem of federal limitations periods in terms
similar to those that now appear in § 1658.26 In particular, the Subcommittee
version of the bill established a residual four-year limitations period for federal
rights of action adopted in the future but did nothing to address the problem
of the timeliness of federal claims arising under preenactment statutes.
Although the bill's failure to address the timeliness of claims under
preenactment statutes attracted critical comments from many of the witnesses
who testified at the September hearing,27 the House Subcommittee ultimately
21. See REPORT, supra note 8, at 93.
22. See id.
23. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 499-500 (noting Kastenmeier's role in the development of the
legislation).
24. Hearings, supra note 1, at 82 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (describing the process by which
Kastenmeier and Rep. Carlos Moorhead identified the recommendations in the Study Committee report that
were "regarded as sufficiently noncontroversial to be implemented in the limited time that remained in this
Congress").
25. See id. at 82-83 (describing the introduction of the House version of the Senate bill as occurring
at Sen. Joseph Biden's request and noting the controversy that surrounded the bill).
26. The draft bill, H.R. 5381, 101st Cong. (1990), included as section 112 the fallback limitations
period that became § 1658. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 9 (reprinting section 112).
27. See Norwood, supra note 14, at 505 (citing submissions to the House Subcommittee by Judges
Deanell R. Tacha and Joseph F. Weis, Jr., and by representatives of the Department of Justice and the
public interest group Public Citizen, all supporting the extension of the four-year limitations period to
claims under preenactment statutes).
[Vol. 107: 393
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decided to retain this feature of the provision.2' The House Report tells the
story as follows:
Witnesses testifying on behalf of the Department of Justice and the
Judicial Conference, urged that this section be made retrospective, so
as to provide a fallback statute of limitations for previously enacted
legislation lacking a limitations period. As witness George Freeman
noted at the hearing, however, with respect to many statutes that have
no explicit limitations provision, the relevant limitations period has
long since been resolved by judicial decision, with the applicable
period decided upon by the courts varying dramatically from statute
to statute. Under these circumstances, retroactively imposing a four
year statute of limitations on legislation that the courts have
previously ruled is subject to a six month limitations period in one
statute, and a ten year period in another, would threaten to disrupt the
settled expectations of a great many parties. Given that settling the
expectations of prospective parties is an essential purpose of statutes
of limitation, the Committee was reluctant to apply this section
retroactively without further study to ensure that the benefits of
retroactive application would indeed outweigh the costs.:'
The report thus cites a concern with the disruption of settled expectations in
explaining the Subcommittee's decision to ignore the critics and proceed with
a prospective solution. The action of the House Subcommittee proved decisive,
and the final terms of § 1658 follow the prospective structure developed by
Congressman Kastenmeier.
Academic observers have consistently rejected the argument from settled
expectations as a justification for the action of the House Subcommittee.
Professor Kimberly Norwood, the statute's leading academic critic, argues that
the Subcommittee's concerns with retroactivity and settled expectations do not
justify the congressional refusal to extend the four-year limitations period to
claims under existing statutes.30 Professor Norwood notes that Congress could
have fashioned a fallback limitations period for claims arising under existing
statutes and could have solved any retroactivity problem by making the statute
applicable only to claims that accrue after its effective date." Such an accrual
28. As the excerpt from the House Report reveals. .ee ifra text accompanying note 29. the retention
of the prospective feature of the statute represented, at least in pan. a decision to credit the concerns of
George Freeman, Jr., who testified, "'The very reasons for having a uniform Federal statute of limitations
where none is presently specified is to provide certainty and predictability But making it retroactive is
counter to those very principles." Hearings, supra note 1. at 246 (statement of George C Freeman. Jr.
Chair, ABA Business Law Section).
29. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24 (1990), reprinted tit 1990 U S C C A N 6860. 6870
30. See Norwood, aupra note 14, at 506-08 (arguing that no retroactivity problem %ould have resulted
from a decision by Congress to create a general four-year limitations penod for chums arising under
statutes already on the books in December 1990 and to apply the statute only to claims ansing after the
effective date of the statute).
31. See id. at 506-07.
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approach would have addressed any conceivable concern of the institutional
defendant: All such defendants could prospectively adjust as needed to
conform to the new limitations period that would henceforth govern claims
under preenactment statutes. Norwood concludes that the congressional
rejection of the proposed creation of a fallback limitations period for claims
under such statutes was "startling," both because it rejected the Study
Committee's recommendation and the weight of thoughtful testimony and
because it did so on the basis of a groundless concern.32 Other academic
critics of the statute share Norwood's view that Congress faced no substantial
problem of retroactivity.
33
The shared view that Congress could have solved the retroactivity problem
has fed the perception that Congress failed to do its job, leading to a call for
Congress to revisit the issue and supply the missing limitations periods.34
Although we agree that an accrual approach might have surmounted the
retroactivity problems, we do not fully accept the standard critique and do not
share the view that Congress necessarily must legislate again.
B. Rethinking the Standard Critique of § 1658
Our disagreement with the standard account stems from our sense that
interest group considerations may explain why Congress framed the statute as
it did. Interest groups have long played a central role in academic accounts of
the legislative process, although portraits of their influence vary from the
beneficent to the pernicious depending on the model of the legislative process
one selects. Much of the period immediately following World War II was
characterized by a relatively benign conception of the role of interest groups,
a conception that followed from a public-spirited view of the role of
legislators.36 More recently, public choice theorists have offered a more
32. See id. at 507.
33. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 14, at 507-09 (discounting the House's concern with retroactivity and
proposing a solution similar to Professor Norwood's).
34. See Norwood, supra note 14, at 517-18 (proposing the congressional enactment of a new four-year
limitations period for all claims, express or implied, arising under acts of Congress that lack express periods
and including accrual language to address the problem of retroactivity); see also Nelson, supra note 14,
at 509-11 (discussing the difficulty of persuading Congress to provide statute-by-statute limitations periods
and proposing instead a general four-year limitations period to govern existing rights of action).
35. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 18-25, 542-44 (1995) (summarizing
the debates over public choice and interest group pluralism).
36. Legislators, in this model of interest group pluralism, act as ideologically motivated public servants
who conscientiously attempt to develop rules for a good society, while interest groups present competing
conceptions of the public good. By forging compromises among competing views, legislators were thought
to produce good policy outcomes. For an overview of the model of interest group pluralism that seemed
to dominate academic treatments of the legislative process in the 1950s, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). On the
role of Professors Hart and Sacks in the development of the legal process school, see William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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cynical account of the motivation of legislators and a more jaundiced
assessment of the influence of interest groups. 7
Whatever one's conception of the role of interest groups in American
politics, common sense suggests that proposals to create, lengthen, or shorten
statutes of limitations will attract fairly close attention from the affected
interest groups. In general, we would expect the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants to diverge, with the former preferring lengthy limitations periods
and the latter preferring shorter ones. Beginning with this obvious (and rather
banal) postulate, it follows that legislators who take up the task of formulating
appropriate statutes of limitations will face an array of competing interests and
conflicting pressures. On balance, consumer advocates-such as Public Citizen
and various environmental groups-will tend to support relatively lengthy
limitations periods, whereas business groups and other institutional
defendants-such as the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chambers
of Commerce, and lobbyists for small businesses-will tend to support shorter
ones.
For one relatively clear example of the influence of prospective defendants
in the drafting and enactment of advantageous statutes of limitations, consider
the amendments to a 1990 statute of limitations that the Illinois General
Assembly adopted in March 1995. The 1990 statute subjected claims of
attorney malpractice to a six-year statute of repose, running from the date of
the act or omission.3 But the 1990 repose provision included a proviso that
excepted claims arising from "the death of the person for whom the
professional services were rendered"; for such claims, the proviso created
specific time limits that ran from the date of the client's death (apparently on
the theory that many victims of malpractice in estate planning would not
discover the wrong until after the initiation of probate proceedings or a will
contest).39 The 1995 amendment struck the proviso from the statute,
apparently in an effort to extend the benefits of the repose provision to
attorneys who commit malpractice in the course of providing such estate
planning advice. By eliminating the proviso, the amended version of the statute
appears to shield estate planners from liability any time their clients live more
than six years after the estate planning services were provided and fail to
discover the attorney's malpractice during the intervening period. Not
37. For useful accounts of public choice theory, see DANIEL A FARBER & PHILIP P FRICKEY. LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr, Politics Without Romance" Imphcataonu of Pubhc
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L REv 275 (I 988). and Jonathan R Macey. Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation- An Interest Group Model. 86 COLUM L
REV. 223 (1986). For our critical reaction to this literature, see Abner J Mikva. Foresord Syrnposwm on
the Theory of Public Cloice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
38. See Act of Mar. 9, 1995, Pub. Act No. 89-0007, § 13-214.3. 1995 I11 Laws 284. 308-09 (setting
forth the text of 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/13-214.3 (West 1994), the 1990 law governing the timeliness of
attorney malpractice claims, as well as the amendatory changes of 1995)
39. See § 13-214(d), 1995 111. Laws at 308.
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surprisingly, the motivating force behind this change in the period of repose
was the Section on Trusts and Estates of the Illinois State Bar Association. 0
Interest group considerations like those that influenced the Illinois
legislature may help to explain why the Kastenmeier bill addressed the
problem of limitations in the terms chosen, rather than implementing the
recommendations of the Study Committee. Recall that the Study Committee
made three proposals: (I) that Congress create a prospective fallback
limitations period (much like § 1658) to fill gaps in any laws that future
Congresses might enact without such periods; (2) that Congress cull through
the United States Code and write limitations periods to govern all such rights
of action that lacked such limits at the time; and (3) that Congress create a
retrospective fallback limitations period to govern existing rights of action as
to which no specific provisions were adopted.4 While such recommendations
may have made eminently good sense from the perspective of the federal
courts, which otherwise would have faced the messy business of gap-filling,
their legislative implementation predictably would have attracted a great deal
of interest group opposition.
An example from the House Report illustrates the problem. The Supreme
Court's decision in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
42
borrowed a federal six-month limitations period for use in determining the
timeliness of all "hybrid" duty of fair representation claims-the judge-made
claims that disappointed grievants bring to challenge the results of the union-
management arbitration systems in place under many collective bargaining
agreements. An attempt to reopen this settled time limit, through a proposal
either to enact a specific limitations period for such claims or to make
applicable to them a longer retrospective fallback period, predictably would
have attracted the opposition of both labor and management. Significantly, the
House Report included the six-month period established in DelCostello on its
list of the limitations periods that its prospective approach to § 1658 would not
affect. 4
This example illustrates how interest group considerations may have made
the House reluctant to include any retrospective solution to the problem of
state law borrowing in a statute meant to avoid controversy. Although
everyone agrees that state law borrowing makes little sense and wastes judicial
40. See William A. Pleithmann, The Case for Amending the Attorneys Malpractice Law-and an
Urgent Call for Help, TRUSTS & ESTATES (Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Section on Trusts and Estates), Sept.
1994, at I (advocating the extension of the benefits of the six-year repose provision to estate planners
through elimination of the 1990 proviso and requesting help from other concerned lawyers in the effort to
influence the legislative process). In fairness, we note that other groups have obtained the benefit of periods
of repose, as Mr. Pleithmann observes in his article. See id. at 2-3 (describing periods of repose in Illinois
law that benefit doctors, accountants, architects, and manufacturers).
41. See supra text accompanying note 21.
42. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
43. See id. at 169.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870,
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time-after all, the recommendation emerged from the Judicial Workload
Subcommittee of the Federal Courts Study Committee and thus appears to have
reflected concerns about the waste of judicial resources-such good
government considerations rarely attract concerted interest group support for
perfectly understandable reasons. The saving of judicial time will primarily
operate for the benefit of the judges themselves-a group institutionally
unsuited to exercise political clout in Congress-and for society at large.
Without any interest group support, such good government legislation has been
difficult to enact despite the efforts of public-regarding legislators. Coupled
with clear and concentrated opposition, the absence of support makes the
decision to remove all retrospective features from a bill designed to avoid
controversy understandable.
Such interest group considerations help to highlight the incompleteness of
the academic critique of the decision to make the statute applicable only to
newly enacted statutes. As noted above, academic critics emphasize the House
Report's reference to the disruption of settled expectations as the likely reason
for the final prospective structure of the legislation and note that careful
drafting could have addressed the issue of settled expectations. But such an
explanation fails to perceive that any legislative tampering with established,
albeit judge-made, limitations periods might have attracted the opposition of
well-organized interest groups. Such organized opposition would have
presented more than a mere drafting problem. It would have threatened the
ability of the House Subcommittee to address the problem of limitations at all,
especially in the time available.
The House Report's stated concern with the disruption of settled
expectations may in fact have reflected worries about interest groups and what
they would do. The House had good reason to worry that changes to clearly
established limitations periods would attract organized opposition. In 1989,
Kastenmeier had introduced a residual or fallback limitations period of ten
years in length that would have applied to both subsequently enacted and
existing statutory rights of action.' Professor Nelson reports that this
provision attracted opposition and never reached the House floor."7 At the
hearings one year later, Kastenmeier drew on this experience in emphasizing
the importance of avoiding controversy; his 1990 bill reduced the residual
limitations period from ten to four years and chose to address the limitations
problem prospectively. These changes did not pass without notice; a
representative of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Federal Judicial Improvements commented favorably on Kastenmeier's
45. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text
46. See H.R. 3553. 101st Cong. (1989).
47. See Nelson, 3upra note 14, at 499 & n 296
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decision to shorten the limitations period from ten years to four.48
Interest group pressures may also help to explain why the House seriously
considered the comments of the one witness who expressed concern with
retroactivity, George Freeman. 49 Although the limitations periods for rights
of action under preenactment statutes could have been addressed in ways that
would have avoided retroactivity, Freeman may have been signaling opposition
to the prospective alteration of settled limitations periods. Freeman represented
the interests of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association and
thus spoke for the kinds of institutional defendants most likely to have opposed
any statute that proposed to lengthen an established limitations period. In some
respects, because of the ABA mantle, Freeman represented a more moderate
opposition to changes than might have surfaced if the proposal had sought
change in established limitations.
On the whole, the legislative record reveals that interest groups did
participate in the legislative process in a fairly predictable manner. For starters,
a representative of the public interest group Public Citizen testified in favor of
the proposal to make § 1658 fully applicable to claims arising under existing
statutes---a position consistent with the notion that the four-year period
specified in the statute would be relatively generous to consumers, at least in
comparison to many of the judge-made periods that otherwise would apply,
and would provide a measure of certainty and predictability. Similarly, in
opposing such an extension of the four-year period, Mr. Freeman espoused a
position that served the interests of business groups and other institutional
defendants, who would prefer shorter, and less clearly defined, judge-made
periods. (Although both groups pay a price, the risks associated with uncertain
limitations periods bear more heavily on plaintiffs, who face dismissals on the
merits, than on defendants, who face some loss of repose.) Although the record
reveals no evidence that members of the House faced any substantial arm-
twisting from the competing interest groups, it does suggest the ways in which
interest group pressures may have helped to shape the development of the
prospective terms of § 1658.
Such an interest group account of the final terms of § 1658 means that the
legislation may have been more successful than it first appears. The passage
of any legislation whatsoever reflects in good measure the skill of
48. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 242 (statement of Robert Landis, Former Chair, ABA Standing
Committee on Judicial Improvements) (describing the ABA Standing Committee as "pleased" with the
reduction).
49. See id. at 246 (comments of George C. Freeman, Jr.) (expressing concern with a growing trend
toward retroactive legislation and concluding by "strongly urg[ing]" Congress to reject the proposed
application of § 1658 to existing rights of action as improperly retroactive and likely to undermine the goals
of certainty and predictability).
50. See id. at 224 (statement of Alan Morrison, Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group) ("In our
view, the general statute of limitations ought to apply to all cases, and not be limited to laws passed by
Congress after the effective date of [the Act].").
(Vol. 107: 393
Statutes of Limitations
Representative Kastenmeier in avoiding language that would have altered
settled time limits and attracted serious and organized opposition. Once one
recognizes that Kastenmeier may have viewed the real choice before the House
as one between a relatively safe prospective statute of the kind enacted and a
more risky, retrospective approach that may have attracted opposition, one can
forgive the House for its failure to address existing limitations problems.
Section 1658 makes several important contributions to the law governing
the creation of new limitations periods for federal claims. First, the new statute
imposes an important discipline on future Congresses by establishing a four-
year limitations period as a default rule.5 ' Every statutory right of action
created after December 1990 will include a limitations period-either a tailor-
made provision adopted by the enacting Congress or a four-year limitations
period supplied by § 1658. (In theory, of course, Congress might enact a new
federal right of action that both fails to specify a tailor-made period of
limitations and explicitly specifies that the fallback period of four years does
not apply as the measure of timeliness. If such a statute were to appear, a
remote prospect, federal courts might well read it to preclude the application
of any limitations period to the claims in question, rather than as a directive
to return to state law borrowing.) Many federal judges have criticized Congress
for its failure to supply such limitations periods in the past; Judge Posner went
so far in one opinion as to recommend the creation of a superagency watchdog
to ensure that Congress includes a limitations period with all new rights of
52action. Section 1658 supplies the relevant assurance without the creation of
such a watchdog.
The structure chosen by Congress makes sense in light of the history of
previous efforts to fashion a residual limitations period and the opposition that
various interest groups would have raised had Congress sought to move
further. Relatively diffuse groups of consumers will experience more difficulty
than their more concentrated institutional counterparts in devoting resources to
influence the outcomes of legislation before Congress." A relatively generous
four-year default rule makes sense in such a world because it assigns the
burden of legislative inertia to the group best able to overcome the problems
associated with effective lobbying."s To obtain shorter, more advantageous
limitations periods, institutional defendants will have to persuade Congress to
insert specific time periods in statutes. Such a requirement of open dealing will
benefit consumer groups by providing them with information they might
51. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 503-04 (discussing § 1658's lunction ol placing Congress on notice)
52. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co.. 908 F2d 1385. 1395 (7th Cir 1990) (Posner. J.
concurring).
53. See supra text following note 37
54. Cf Ian Ayres & Robert Gerner, Filling Gap3 tin Incomple " Covtiract3 An Econonic The1our of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L. 87, 94 (1989) (arguing that delault rules may matter in terms ol the
information they transfer from repeat to nonrepeat players in a transaction)
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otherwise lack about the presumptively applicable four-year period and by
providing them with a bargaining chip for use in subsequent negotiations. The
four-year default provision thus establishes a framework for future lobbying
that correctly obliges institutional defendants to pursue advantageous outcomes
openly.
In contrast, a short default period of, say, one year would provide a
different and less appealing framework for future legislative deliberations.
Institutional defendants would doubtless know of the one-year period, and they
would have little incentive to seek more advantageous time limits through
specific provisions. Without such information, relatively more diffuse
consumer groups might fail to learn that the fallback limitations period favors
institutional defendants and might fail to seek legislative specification. One can
readily understand, therefore, why Congress refrained from adopting a proposal
to establish a one-year fallback limitations period during the 1940s."
Apart from these structural considerations, the four-year period identified
in § 1658 makes fairly good sense as an all-purpose limitations period for civil
actions. One cannot, of course, develop (or defend) a particular limitations
period through a purely logical process; one can only survey comparable
limitations periods and use them as benchmarks with which to develop a rough
idea of workable lengths for corresponding or analogous limitations periods.
Such a survey reveals three benchmarks offering rough support for the four-
year period in § 1658. First, Congress had previously adopted a five-year
residual statute of limitations for federal criminal proceedings.56 Second,
Congress had established a catch-all or residual five-year limitations period for
suits brought to enforce federal penalties.57 The four-year period for civil
claims in § 1658 makes a certain amount of sense against the backdrop of
these somewhat analogous five-year periods. Third, we have reviewed an
unpublished, but relatively comprehensive, survey of federal limitations periods
for civil actions. The survey, by Professor Peter Raven-Hansen, computes the
average federal limitations period as three to four years in length.58
55. The 79th Congress rejected as too short a proposed one-year general limitations period for civil
actions. See Developments in the Law--Statutes of Linitations, 63 HAtV. L. REv. 1177, 1268 n.754 (1950)
(reporting the rejection of a proposed one-year limitations period following an assertion by the Attorney
General that such a period was too short for claims arising under federal laws of trademark, copyright, civil
rights, and antitrust).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994) (stating that "[eixcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an
action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years"). For a discussion of the statute's
applicability to penalty and forfeiture actions on behalf of the federal government and its inapplicability
to private civil litigation, see Carie Goodman MeKinney, Note, Statute of Linitations for Citizen Suit$
Under the Clean Water Act, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 195, 205-06 (1986).
58. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 12, at 43-44 (citing a survey of some 150 federal statutes ol
limitations that computed their average length to be three to four years).
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To be sure, these benchmarks stop well short of proving that Congress
picked out the "right" fallback limitations period. Determination of the -right"
period presents an imponderable empirical challenge, given the variety of
situations in which limitations concerns might arise. We have been unable to
locate any evidence of which factors Congress actually relied upon in making
its choice of four years. Yet the analogies help to confirm that the four-year
period actually chosen rests comfortably within the range of workable
solutions. Even if Congress stumbled on the four-year period, its choice at
least was made in a process of prospective legislation that moderated the
interest group pressures that have influenced the selection of other, more
particular, limitations periods.
The simple fact that Congress established a residual or fallback limitations
period also means that we can consider the four-year period as properly
applicable to a wide variety of civil actions without worrying unduly that the
provision does not properly balance the competing interests of plaintiffs (who
seek access to court for adjudication of rights) and defendants (who seek
repose and immunity from suit). By its terms, the residual period in § 1658
applies to all civil actions as to which Congress does not othervise specify a
limitations period. The four-year period thus applies across the board to
virtually any kind of civil action Congress might conceivably create. While one
can defend the period chosen for its structural implications for future lobbying
and for its correspondence to other relevant measures of timeliness, much of
the value of the statute derives from the simple fact that Congress has now
chosen a generally applicable limitations period.
Finally, congressional adoption of a fallback four-year limitations period
represents an important legislative acknowledgement that the regime of state
law borrowing no longer makes sense, if indeed it ever did. The
recommendation of the Study Committee rested on the claim that the regime
of state law borrowing imposed a significant and unjustifiable burden on
federal judges. 59 Section 1658 emerged from a Congress that accepted this
critique and sought to address the problem to the extent possible and within
the time available in a manner that would avoid interest group opposition. To
be sure, Congress enacts statutes rather than policies; one cannot predicate a
change in the rule of state law borrowing on policies said to inhere in § 1658.
Nevertheless, the congressional rejection of state law borrowing, coupled with
the congressional provision of a generally applicable, nationally uniform
fallback limitations period sets the stage for the final abandonment of the
current regime of presumptive-and irrational-reliance upon state law.
59. See supra text accompanying note 8
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II. TOWARD A REGIME OF NATIONALLY UNIFORM FEDERAL LIMITATIONS
PERIODS: THE RELEVANCE OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Section 1658 plainly ends state law borrowing for claims arising under
federal statutes first enacted after December 1, 1990.60 It could also lead to
the end of the regime of state law borrowing as applied to rights of action
under federal statutes that were already on the books on that date. True,
Congress left that area untouched by the statute; but as the branch of
government responsible for the rule of state law borrowing, the federal
judiciary may reconsider the doctrine. We believe that the federal courts retain
their power over the content of the rules of federal common law that determine
the timeliness of claims arising under such preenactment statutes. The Supreme
Court could and should use these retained common law powers to establish a
regime of presumptive reliance upon federal limitations periods. Nothing
Congress did in the 1990 statute precludes such a result.
A. Federal Common Law and the Inadequacy of the Court's Proffered
Justifications for State Law Borrowing
The Supreme Court has long chosen to fashion rules of federal common
law as the measure of the timeliness of federal rights of action for which
Congress has failed to specify a particular limitations period. The practice of
judicial gap-filling began in Adams v. Woods,6 a decision by the Marshall
Court, continued throughout the nineteenth century,62 and today still
commands the support of Justices across the spectrum of views on issues of
federal common law and judicial gap-filling.6 3 Even Justice Scalia-the most
ardent opponent of judicial innovation in areas thought to lie within
congressional competence -- accepts the idea that federal courts should
routinely fill the gaps that result from the failure of Congress to specify
60. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
61. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
62. See, e.g., Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) (applying a six-year tort limitations period
from state law to a federal patent claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts); cf. M'Cluny
v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830) (applying an Ohio statute of limitations to a state-created trespass
action brought in federal court against a federal officer).
63. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995) (holding unanimously that state law
limitations periods govern federal claims under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act);
cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 157-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that state law applies of its own force as the measure of timeliness, unless preempted by conflicting
federal law); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172-74 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Rules of Decision Act compels reliance on state law limitations periods to fill
gaps in federal statutes).
64. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189-91 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
against judicial "creation" of implied rights of action and advocating an absolute rule against the
recognition of rights of action absent an explicit provision in the text of a statute).
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limitations periods for federal rights of action and should do so by applying
limitations periods drawn from noncongressional sources.65
In addition to broad agreement on the propriety of gap-filling, 6 the
Justices generally agree that the federal courts should look to analogous state
law limitations periods as the primary or presumptively applicable measure of
the timeliness of federal claims. In North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,6 7 the
Court unanimously held that state law furnished the rule of timeliness to
govern actions to enforce rights under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification (WARN) Act. In the course of its decision, the Court reaffirmed
its "'longstanding"' commitment to presumptive reliance upon state law to fill
the gap created by a missing federal limitations period." The Court
recognized that it has occasionally borrowed periods of limitations from
analogous federal statutes.69 It emphasized, however, that borrowing from
federal sources remains an exception to the rule of primary reliance upon state
law.70 Borrowing from federal sources comes into play only where otherwise
applicable state limitations periods would "'frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies' 7' or where the federal rule would
provide a "'significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking. '72
Despite its reaffirmation in North Star Steel, the rule of primary reliance
on state law rests on relatively weak foundations. In the leading case from the
nineteenth century, Campbell v. Haverhill,73 the Court relied upon sheer
necessity to justify its application of a state law limitations period. Congress
had previously supplied a six-year limitations period for patent claims' " but
had failed, in the course of recodifying the statute, to specify a time limit for
infringements occurring after 1874. Confronted in Campbell with one such
unrestricted claim, the Court filled the gap by borrowing a state law limitations
period identical in length to that which Congress had previously applied to the
65. See Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 157-65 (Scaha. J. concumng) (observing that state law
limitations periods routinely apply in cases where Congress has failed to spectfy limitations periods)
66. With but one exception, the Court has viewed the failure ol Congress to spcifl) a limitations
period as an invitation to the federal courts to borrow a gapiller from some other source The lone
exception is Occidental Life Insurance Co. v EEOC. 432 U S 355 (1977). ,hich refused to borTow a
limitation after concluding that Congress meant to leave government claims to enlorkc Title VII
unrestricted. Cf. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U S. at 170 (Scalia. J . concurrng) tsuggcsting that where
federal interests preclude the application of state limitations penods lederal '.ourns should retrain from
borrowing a federal period and refuse to apply any limitations penod at all)
67. 515 U.S. 29 (1995).
68. Id. at 1931 (quoting Agency Hoing Corp . 483 U S at 147)
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Id. (quoting DelCostello v. International Bhd ol Teamsters. 462 U S 151. 161 t19h3) iquoting
Occidental, 432 U.S. at 367)).
72. Id. (quoting Reed v. United Transp Union. 488 U S 319. 324 (1989) iquoting l),-lCoutello. 462
U.S. at 172)).
73. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
74. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat 198. 206
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federal patent rights at issue.75 The Court justified its decision to apply state
law on the ground that the absence of any limitations period would offend the
rule of law, quoting with approval the decision by Chief Justice Marshall in
Adams v. Woods,76 which characterized temporally unlimited federal rights
of action as "utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws.""
Although its prudential concerns came through clearly enough, the
Campbell Court was hard pressed as a theoretical matter to justify its reliance
upon state law. The Marshall Court had filled the gap in Adams, after all, by
borrowing a limitations period from federal law and had seemingly refused to
consider the possible applicability of state law.78 Marshall's implicit rejection
of state law was consistent with the then-current conception of statutes of
limitations as matters of procedure7' and with the Marshall Court's
subsequent refusal in Wayman v. Southard" to countenance state regulation
of the practice and procedure of federal courts."t Foreclosed by such
theoretical barriers from arguing that state law applied of its own force, the
Campbell Court chose to rely instead on a claim that Congress, through the
Rules of Decision Act,82 had directed the federal courts to incorporate state
law to fill gaps in federal statutes.8 3 But while the inflexible command of the
Rules of Decision Act could explain the application of state law to patent
claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, it could not solve
all of the Court's problems. For as the Campbell Court went on to observe, the
Act did not require the federal courts to apply state statutes of limitations that
were unduly short or that discriminated against the enforcement of the federal
75. See Campbell, 155 U.S. at 613-14.
76. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
77. Id. at 342; Campbell, 155 U.S. at 616-17.
78. See Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 336. The two-year federal limitations period in Adana applied
by its terms to fines or forfeitures sought by way of information; the statute said nothing about actions in
debt to recover a penalty. Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless held that the two-year period applied. See id.
at 342. No one appears to have suggested that some state law limitations period for actions in debt ought
to have applied to the proceeding, even though such applicability would have eliminated the argument for
stretching the federal statute.
79. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 482-83 (Boston, Charles C. Little
& James Brown 2d ed. 1841) (stating that "statutes of limitation ... are strictly questions affecting the
remedy, and not questions upon the merits" and therefore must be determined by reference to the law of
the forum); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (relying upon the traditional
characterization of limitations periods as matters of procedure in upholding the power of state courts to
apply their own limitations periods to claims with which they have little contact other than as the forum
state).
80. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
81. See id. at 49 (holding that the inability of state legislatures to claim jurisdiction over federal
procedure is "one of those political axioms, an attempt to demonstrate which, would be a waste of
argument not to be excused").
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
83. See Campbell, 155 U.S. at 614-15; cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S.
143, 157-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Campbell supports his claim that state law




rights at issue.8 What the Court ultimately sought was a flexible warrant for
fashioning limitations periods according to the circumstances of the particular
case.
Post-Erie85 decisions locate that warrant in the power of federal courts
to fashion federal common law, but they do little to explain the Court's
preference for state law as the source of borrowed limitations periods. As the
Court explained in Holnberg v. Armnbrecht," state limitations periods apply
to federal claims, not of their own force and not by virtue of the Rules of
Decision Act, but only by virtue of their "implied absorption ... within the
interstices of the federal enactments" through the process of fashioning federal
common law.87 It follows that the Court remains free to borrow a federal
limitations period in appropriate cases; indeed, since Holmberg, the Court has
borrowed from federal sources on at least three occasions.' But despite its
own recognition that it may borrow from federal sources, the Court has largely
failed to justify its continuing adherence to a rule of primary reliance on state
law.89
One might try to justify the Court's rule by likening its preference for state
law to its traditional willingness to consider the interests of the states in the
course of deciding whether to create federal common law in other fields. In
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.," for example, Justice Scalia's decision
to fashion a federal contractors' defense had to overcome an argument in favor
of deferring to traditional state control over the definition of tort law."
Similarly, in United States v. Kimbell Foods, lnc. ,' the Court decided to
84. See Canpbell, 155 U.S at 615 (emphasrizng that the relerence to state las, as ruis ol d-tcsion
"in cases where they apply" may gec the federal courts -a certain discretion uth rcspe Ii to the
enforcement of state statutes").
85. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U & 64 (1938) (declanng that the federal .ouns must appl, state rules
of decision, rather than general federal common law. to resolse dtsputes ainsing from state.-,reatcd t.laims,
86. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). On the continuing vitality ol Holhnbher, see Richard L Mamrus. Fratuldt
Concealment in Federal Court: Toisard a More l)iparate Standard'. 71 Gl-o L J N29 i 1983,
87. Hobnberg, 327 U S at 395; 3ee alao DelCostello v International Bhd o Teamsters., 462 U S 15 1.
160 & n.13 (1983) (explaining that neither Erie nor the Rules ol Decision Act compels the appliation of
state law limitations periods to claims created by Congress or which Congress failed to spe itl a paitiular
period).
88. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind. Prupis & Petigro%% % Gilbertson. 51 US 350 (191 P tiapplinkg a
limitations period from elsewhere in lederal secunties la%% to measure the timeliness of settion l0b-5
claims); Agency Holding Corp., 483 U S at 143 (applying the lour-%ear limitations penti in Cla, ton Act
civil enforcement actions as the measure ol the timeliness ot all ci il RICO claims). lVel(o031llo. 462 U S
at 151 (applying the Labor Act's six-month limitations period ir untar labor praLtice ..laims as the
measure of the timeliness of hybnd duty ol lair representation and breach ol contract .lanis). q (i.Litdntal
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (holding that no statute o linitatitons applies to ,claims brought
by the EEOC to enforce Title VII and interpreting congressional silence is rel~-ting state lasi bo rossing
for claims brought by the lederal government)
89. See North Star Steel Co. v Thomas, 515 U S 29. 34 (1995) (des.rbing federal bioro%%ing as a
closely circumscribed and narrow exception to the rule ot pimar> jehianke on state lass
90. 487 U.S. 500 (1988)
91. See id. at 515-31 (1988) (Brennan. J , dissenting) (criti.iting the majont an both separation of
powers and federalism grounds).
92. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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subordinate the priority of liens arising from federal programs to the state's
interest in the application of internally consistent rules of priority for
competing creditors.93 Many commentators agree that the interests of the
states ordinarily deserve at least some consideration in the decision whether to
fashion federal common law.
94
In contrast to cases like Boyle and Kimbell Foods, however, the states have
little discernible interest in the application of their rules of timeliness to federal
rights of action. States enjoy presumptive control over any field of government
regulation that Congress has not occupied, but this interest in preserving
control as against federal preemption does not apply with any force to the
determination of the timeliness of rights of action that have been, by definition,
created by federal law. Unlike the situation in Boyle, where Congress's refusal
to create a federal defense for government contractors made the argument for
continued state control somewhat more difficult for the majority to ignore,
95
the regime of state law borrowing comes into play only when Congress has
(explicitly or implicitly) created federal rights enforceable in federal courts.
State regulatory primacy thus offers little support for a regime of presumptive
reliance upon state law limitations periods.
Similarly, states have little interest in the application of internally
consistent time limits to federal claims, many of which do not readily conform
to existing state law categories. Consider, for example, the question of which
limitations period should govern claims by disappointed union members who
wish to challenge both their discharge as a breach by their employer of the
collective bargaining agreement and the handling of their grievance as a breach
of their union's federal duty of fair representation. Many federal courts
struggled with this question, analogizing the collective bargaining agreement
claim to one brought under state contract law and the duty of fair
representation claim to one of legal (or other) malpractice; other federal courts
saw the claims as tantamount to efforts to vacate an arbitration award and
applied relatively short time limits.96 Whatever the proper characterization,
the sheer variety of possible analogies and the inability of state courts to secure
uniformity through control over the development of the law serves to reduce
substantially any state interest in the uniform application of state rules of
93. See id. at 740.
94. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Colmnon Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383, 410 (1964).
95. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-14.
96. Compare United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981) (applying a state law limitations
period for an action to vacate an arbitration award to an employee's challenge to the legality of the arbitral
award under a collective bargaining agreement), and UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966)
(applying a state law limitations period for contract claims to a suit brought by the union to enforce a
collective bargaining agreement), with DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)
(overruling Mitchell implicitly and substituting a federal six-month limitations period for an employee's
claim against both the employer and the union).
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timeliness. Stronger arguments support the development of nationally uniform
rules of timeliness to govern such claims.1
7
In the absence of any state interest in the application of state limitations
periods to federal rights of action, the Court has turned to other justifications
for the current regime. As we noted above,9" the Court has defended state law
borrowing on grounds of necessity by repeating its view that unrestricted
federal claims would be "'utterly repugnant"' to the rule of law." If this
argument from utter repugnance can justify a federal judicial role, it can hardly
justify a rule of presumptive reliance on state law. Borrowing from federal
sources would avoid the problem of the temporally unrestricted claim just as
effectively as state law borrowing; indeed, the Court originally deployed the
argument from utter repugnance to support borrowing from federal
sources.
t °°
Apart from this claim of necessity, the Court has defended its current
approach by reference to a construct of presumed legislative intent.'"' In
effect, the Court holds that its willingness to fashion judge-made limitations
periods in the past justifies the continuing creation of judge-made periods in
the future; the Court's rule of state law borrowing operates as an interpretive
rule for handling cases of omitted limitations periods and gives rise to reliance
interests on the part of Congress and interest groups. A decision to abandon
such judicial setting of limits might unfairly surprise legislators (or institutional
defendants and their lobbyists) who reasonably relied on the continued
application of the rule in question.
Such stare decisis considerations cannot justify continued and constant
adherence to a rule of state law borrowing. The sheer variety of potentially
applicable state limitations periods makes it extremely difficult for members
of Congress or lobbyists to predict with any confidence what period of
limitations would apply to any particular statutory right of action that Congress
has chosen to create. Even if such certainty existed at the time the legislation
was enacted in one or more states or federal judicial circuits, subsequent
97. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158-72 (developing a uniform federal six-month limitations period
for hybrid actions against employers and unions and concluding that conflicting state limitations peniods
were an unsatisfactory vehicle for the enforcement of federal law)
98. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77
99. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1894) (quoting Adams v WoWs. 6 U S (2 Cranch)
336, 342 (1805)).
100. See supra text accompanying note 78 (discussing the rationale of Chief Justice Marshall's
decision in Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805)).
101. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas. 515 U.S. 29. 34 (1995) (noting that -it is not only
appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar w ith ourl
precedents ... and that it expect[s] its enactmentlsl to be interpreted in conformity with them.. (quoting
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677. 699 (1979))). DeCosrello. 462 U S at 158 ("WVe have
generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute ol
limitations under state law."); Campbell, 155 U.S. at 616 ("Is it not more reasonable to presume that
Congress, in authorizing an action for infringement. intended to subject such action to the general laws of
the State applicable to actions of a similar nature?.. IM ust we not presume that Congress intended that
the remedy should be enforced in the manner common to ltke actions within the same jurisdiction 1")
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changes in relevant state limitations periods may well alter the time periods in
question. In any case, many federal rights of action arise from the
congressional regulation of transactions in interstate commerce-transactions
that often give rise to the possibility of litigation in more than one state, In
light of the uncertainty surrounding the locus of litigation, interest groups and
members of Congress would have great difficulty building a case of reliance
on the basis of the claimed applicability of any particular state limitations
period. The construct of presumed legislative intent thus resembles the
argument from "utter[] repugnan[ce]"' 2 in that it supports continued judicial
gap-filling but not continued reliance upon state law.
Even this attenuated "presumed intent of Congress" argument for state law
borrowing does not appear to survive the enactment of § 1658. As we saw
earlier, the creation of the fallback four-year federal limitations period in
§ 1658 establishes a new default rule that will structure the lobbying and
legislative processes for the foreseeable future. Congress and interest groups
now know that the failure to insert a specific limitations period into a federal
statute that creates a new right of action will result in the application of the
four-year period. In other words, no member of Congress or interest group can
base a claim of reasonable reliance on the willingness of the federal courts to
supply limitations periods by reference to state law. As a prospective matter
then, the Court simply cannot justify continued adherence to a rule of state law
borrowing by reference to its construct of "presumed intent."'
0 3
We believe that § 1658 substantially undermines the regime of state law
borrowing. First, the statute implements a vision of federal uniformity and
simplified limitations-setting much at odds with the complexity of the current
regime. Second, § 1658 establishes a structure for future lobbying that
eliminates any stare decisis justification for the maintenance of the status quo.
B. Toward a Regime of Federal Uniformity in Borrowed Limitations Periods
Just about every observer agrees that a regime of uniform federal
limitations periods would outperform the current presumption in favor of
borrowing from state law. As we noted at the beginning of this Essay,"°
reliance upon state law requires federal judges to survey an array of potentially
applicable state limitations periods and to choose the most analogous period
for application to a federal right of action that contains no such period. Such
a regime exacts substantial process costs, as courts and litigants struggle to
identify the most analogous limitations period in state law or, if no good state
analogies exist, to select the appropriate federal limitations period. In addition,
102. Campbell, 155 U.S. at 616 (quoting Adans, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 342).
103. See North Star Steel, 515 U.S. at 34 n.* (recognizing that arguments from presumed intent do
not apply to statutes enacted after the effective date of § 1658).
104. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the regime results in the development of limitations periods that may vary
dramatically from state to state. Such variability introduces capriciousness and
a lack of uniformity into federal law and creates obvious incentives for forum
shopping as litigants vie for differing periods.'"' Presumptive reliance upon
federal law limitations periods would help to solve many of these problems.
But presumptive use of federal sources would not solve all problems. Even
in a world where state law limitations periods were eliminated from the
calculus, complexity and uncertainty would remain. Litigants would
presumably continue to identify a wide array of analogous federal limitations
periods for courts to consider. Some continuing variability would persist as the
product of federal judicial disagreement over which statute offered the closest
analogy to the particular case.'" Apart from uncertainty and variability,
reliance upon federal analogies would project one federal limitations period
into a different and unanticipated context. Such projections cause the greatest
conceptual difficulty in cases where relatively particularized interest group
considerations appear to have influenced the congressional selection of the
limitations period proposed for use as an analogy. A period chosen by
Congress to accommodate competing interest groups in the field of antitrust
litigation, for example, may not accommodate the different groups affected by
the assertion of civil RICO claims." 7 Judges understand the existence of
these problems of projection in theory but lack practical tools with which to
calibrate their impact in a regime of borrowing."° The Court's continuing
adherence to a rule of state law borrowing may reflect its perception that a
switch to federal law borrowing might not constrain the judicial process
sufficiently to gain much by way of simplicity or certainty. Certainly, Justice
Scalia's image of federal courts and litigants "prowling hungrily" through the
federal law books in search of analogies does not seem far from the mark."
105. For an overview of these problems, see Norwood. %upra note 14. it 480-502 See alo Nelson.
supra note 14, at 466-86.
106. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson. 501 U S 350. 361 I91)
(applying a uniform federal one-year-from-discovery three-year- repose limitations period and reJecting a
five-year limitations period drawn from elsewhere in federal secunties lawsl. Agency Holding Corp ,
Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1987) (applying a uniform federal lour-year limitations
period to civil RICO claims and rejecting an analogy to a federal five-year period for criminal prosetutions
under RICO).
107. But cf Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S at 143 (applying the lour-)ear limitations period Irom
the Clayton Act, which governs private suits to enlorce the antitrust l.is. to pri'ate c iil RICO
enforcement proceedings).
108. For recognition of the problems of projection entailed tn borrowing a limitations period from one
compromise for use in a different field with diffenng interest group considerations, see Short % Befit-sd/
Shoe Manufacturing Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1393 (7th Citr 1990) (Posner. J .concurring). ,,,hIch explains that
the regime of borrowing "runs the risk of applying one unpnncipled legislative deal to a problem entirel)
outside the scope of the deal."
109. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 166 (Scalia, J . concumng) (characrizing the majonty, in
its decision to borrow a federal statute of limitations, as "prowling hungrily through the Statutes at Large
for an appetizing" statute of limitations).
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Reliance on § 1658 could help to solve these additional problems by
providing a four-year period of limitations for use in most cases of
congressional silence. As we have already seen, Congress chose the four-year
period as a general purpose or fallback limitations period appropriate for use
as the measure of timeliness for any civil action created by federal law. Its
availability for use as the gapfiller in a variety of different federal statutes
suggests that the four-year period can reduce the problems of complexity and
uncertainty otherwise associated with regimes of borrowing. In addition, the
four-year period of § 1658 emerged from a process that was, by design,
relatively free of interest group pressures. The absence of interest group
pressures reduces the problems associated with the projection of the four-year
period into other fields.
Despite the obvious attractions of the four-year residual limitations period
of § 1658, most assume that adopting it for claims arising under preenactment
statutes would require further legislative action. As we noted in Part I,
academics have criticized the statute's failure to address the serious problem
of claims arising under preenactment statutes and argue for the passage of
legislation tailored to such claims."' Similarly, most federal judges who have
faced arguments for the application of the four-year period to claims under
preenactment statutes have dismissed such arguments out of hand."' In
contrast, we believe that the Supreme Court remains free, through the exercise
of its power to fashion rules of federal common law, to create a regime of
federal uniformity that would include substantial reliance on the four-year
fallback as the presumptive period of limitations.
We base our argument on the model of federal common-lawmaking
exemplified by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc."2 Moragne holds that
judge-made federal maritime law creates a right of action to recover damages
for injuries resulting in the death of a longshoreman due to the
"unseaworthiness" of a vessel plying territorial waters."' Remarkably,
Moragne asserted this authority over the content of federal common law in the
face of two facts: that wrongful death actions traditionally had been regarded
as creatures of statute and that Moragne's claim fell outside the scope of
existing statutory schemes." 4 One statute governed wrongful deaths on the
high seas and another concerned wrongful deaths due to negligence, but none
applied to the unseaworthiness claims of Mrs. Moragne. 15 Rather than
treating this legislative silence as dispositive of the particular claim before it,
110. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
11I. See supra note 16.
112. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
113. Id. at 395, 407-08.
114. See id. at 390-403.
115. Or, as Judge Posner pithily put the matter after summarizing the array of inapplicable statutory
remedies, Mrs. Moragne's claim "fell among all these stools." Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 201 (1987).
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the Court viewed itself as retaining control over the content of federal common
law." 6 After carefully reviewing the nineteenth-century origins of the rule
against recovery for wrongful death, the Court jettisoned the rule and allowed
the action to proceed." 7 The Court went further, however, suggesting that
provisions borrowed from the (otherwise inapplicable) Death on the High Seas
Act" 8 could govern the amount of the recovery available under the new right
of action and the identity of the proper beneficiaries--questions that otherwise
would have been difficult to answer judicially." 9
Moragne establishes that the Court may reconsider a rule of federal
common law that gave rise to the passage of a limited federal statute. The
legitimacy of continuing judicial control over the content of federal common
law offers a complete answer to those who would argue that the failure of
Congress to address claims under preenactment statutes in § 1658 forecloses
any evolution in the rule of presumptive reliance upon state law that has long
governed the timeliness of such claims. Moragne also makes clear that, having
altered the underlying rule of common law, the Court remains free to give
content to its new rule by borrowing from the federal statute closest at hand.
Moragne thus opens the way to a federal decision to establish a new common
law rule of presumptive reliance upon federal law borrowing and of similar
reliance upon the residual four-year limitations period of § 1658 for use in
measuring the timeliness of claims under preenactment statutes. Such a four-
year period would apply, not by virtue of congressional action, but as the result
of the ongoing evolution of federal common law.
Although Moragne helps to answer most doubts as to the legitimacy of a
judicial decision to modify the rule of borrowing by incorporating the four-year
period of § 1658, we should briefly consider a variety of plausible but
ultimately unpersuasive arguments against our solution to the timeliness
problem. To begin with, nothing in the text of § 1658 forecloses the
recognition of continuing federal common-lawmaking authority over borrowed
limitations periods. By its terms, § 1658 governs actions arising under statutes
enacted after December 1990.2' For such actions, § 1658 specifies a four-
year limitations period, except as otherwise provided by law.' 2' As to actions
arising under statutes already on the books in December 1990, § 1658 has
nothing to say. The statute does not speak about either the period of limitations
for existing actions or the process by which the federal courts should fashion
limitations periods to govern them.
116. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397-403.
117. See id. at 375, 402-03.
118. 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (West 1975) (repealed 1980)
119. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 407-08.
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994).
121. See id.
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
This legislative silence appears to leave the task of fashioning a federal
common law of borrowed limitations periods in the hands of the federal courts.
Certainly, the willingness of the Supreme Court to borrow from federal law
sources in the wake of § 1658's adoption suggests that the Court does not
regard the statute as having frozen in place a regime of rigid reliance upon
state law. 22 Even the Court's recent reaffirmation of state law primacy
stopped well short of foreclosing the future borrowing of federal limitations
periods in appropriate cases. 23 We simply argue here that the federal courts
should borrow a federal rule in a broader range of cases.
To be sure, a strong textualist might quibble with any attempt on the part
of the federal courts to fill gaps in federal legislation by borrowing a period
of limitations from another source. Such a text-based refusal to fill gaps would
force Congress either to legislate limitations periods for federal rights of action
or to face the prospect that such claims would remain temporally unrestricted.
But, as we have seen, even the Court's most devoted textualists have made
their peace with the longstanding tradition of borrowing state law to fill such
gaps. Once the textualist admits that federal courts may apply rules of
timeliness other than those legislated into place by Congress, the question
becomes not how to interpret the legislative text (which, of course, does not
speak to the problem) but how best to fill the gap in federal law. In this area
of more or less candid judicial lawmaking, congressional texts play a less
significant interpretive role.
Legisprudes who believe (as we do) that legislative history can legitimately
inform the interpretation of statutes may pose a more subtle challenge to our
approach. These critics may rely upon negative implications said to flow from
the explicit refusal of the House Subcommittee to extend the four-year
limitations period of § 1658 to federal actions then on the statute books.'24
Such critics may contend that having failed to persuade Congress to act, the
federal judiciary may not legitimately achieve by judicial decree what it had
been unable to secure from the legislative process.
Although we agree that the House Report helps to explain why the
Subcommittee framed the statute to apply prospectively, we do not believe that
any negative implications from the Report foreclose our approach. For one
thing, the Court rejected a stronger argument from negative implications in
Moragne, where the failure of Congress to create a wrongful death action for
unseaworthiness on the low seas can be said to have implied a congressional
122. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 356-60 (1991)
(applying the one-year-from-discovery, three-year-repose limitations period from elsewhere in the federal
securities laws to govem implied rights of action under section 10(b) and rejecting state law borrowing and
periods from elsewhere in federal law).
123. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (recognizing the possibility that
periods drawn from federal law may better harmonize with the objective of the immediate cause of action).
124. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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design either to foreclose compensation for such claims or to leave the measure
of any compensation to state law. In contrast, the House Report on § 1658
expresses concern not with the use of a four-year period of limitations per se
but with its blanket use in circumstances that would disrupt settled
expectations.12 It was the rigidity entailed in the legislative specification of
four-year limitations periods for all claims that concerned the House, and it is
because of this rigidity that the Report recommended further study to
determine whether the benefits of such a blanket rule would indeed outweigh
the costs.
Ultimately, then, the House Report expresses tacit, but nonetheless clear,
approval for the principle that the federal courts should continue to fashion a
federal common law of limitations periods. As outlined below, such a body of
law might feature presumptive reliance on the four-year period of § 1658 and
remain sensitive to the interests of groups that have come to rely upon the
existing state of the law. In some cases, such reliance factors will weigh in
favor of the ongoing application of the limitations periods that the federal
courts have previously borrowed to govern the timeliness of such claims. In
many other cases, where the federal courts have failed to reach a consensus
about the proper rule of timeliness, reliance interests will pose no substantial
obstacle to the routine use of the four-year period.
Finally, the adoption of our proposed solution need not threaten the ability
of Congress to structure prospective legislation in the future. One might argue
that the retrospective application of a statute that Congress meant to apply
prospectively might disable future Congresses from developing
"noncontroversial" prospective legislation. Imagine a prescient member of
Congress who objected to the Kastenmeier bill on the ground that the federal
courts might adopt our solution and use the four-year period as the measure
of timeliness for one or more of the existing claims that would have been
seemingly unaffected by the prospective terms of the statute. Would such an
objection have derailed the legislation? Obviously, we cannot say for sure. But
Kastenmeier could have addressed the objection either by fixing a particular
limitations period to address the member's concern or by adding language to
the statute forbidding its use as a borrowed limitations period for some
sensitive category of federal statutes.
Even if they agreed with the legitimacy of its judicial creation in the face
of congressional silence, others might argue against our proposal for
presumptive reliance upon a one-size-fits-all four-year period of limitations.
Such critics of a uniform federal rule would build on the common sense idea
that any particular period of limitations must strike a balance among an array
of competing interests: the interest in protecting valid claims, the interest in
prohibiting the prosecution of stale claims, the durability of the evidence, and
125. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24 (1990). reprinted in 1990 U S C C A N 6860. 6870
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the attitude of the legislature toward the claim. 26 Such functional
considerations may influence the legislative calculation of limitations periods
to some degree: The periods for disfavored claims (like defamation) tend to be
relatively short whereas periods for contract claims may vary depending on
evidentiary issues, such as whether the contract appears in writing.'27 Judge
Posner identifies a host of similar variables in the course of arguing that no
single, one-size-fits-all federal limitations period should apply to all
claims.1 s One might contend, building on Posner's claim, that the current
regime of state law borrowing enables the courts to reach a more fine-grained
judgment about the timeliness of federal claims than would a uniform rule.
For a variety of reasons, we do not believe such an argument for
functionality can justify continued adherence to the rule of state law
borrowing. To begin with, one surely can dispute the claim that the
legislatively prescribed limitations periods for existing rights of action left
unaddressed by § 1658 ought to vary according to the nature of the particular
claim. After a careful review of that problem, Professor Raven-Hansen rejected
the argument for functional variability and instead proposed a general purpose
four-year period of limitations for all such claims. 29 He did so for reasons
we find persuasive: existing periods of limitations do not necessarily
correspond to such functional factors; any functionality that once existed may
have disappeared over time; problems of characterization would persist
following the passage of such a statute; and the sheer number of unrestricted
claims, which Raven-Hansen places at more than 200, would make the task of
drafting a functionally variable statute quite daunting.3 ' Professor Raven-
Hansen in effect concludes that the argument for the recognition of nice
theoretical distinctions must give way to arguments from necessity and
convenience in the legislative creation of limitations periods.'
3'
Arguments from necessity and convenience apply with greater force to the
judicial creation of limitations periods in the wake of § 1658. Unlike
legislation that clearly applies throughout the country, judge-made rules
percolate up from the bottom of the judicial hierarchy. Judicial efforts to create
126. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,282 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that limitations
periods are not purely arbitrary); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975) (stating
that the period selected should reflect a balance between "the interests in favor of protecting valid claims"
and the "interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones").
127. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that differing periods for
defamation and contract claims reflect an evaluation of the claims in light of the life expectancy of the
evidence and the reasonable expectations of repose).
128. See Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (identifying such factors as the rate at which evidence will decay, the opportunities for
concealment, and the defendants' interest in repose as relevant in fixing the timeliness of particular suits
and arguing that no single period of limitations would be suitable for the entire range of causes of action).
129. See Raven-Hansen, supra note 12.
130. See id. at 37-42.
131. See id. at 37 ("'Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience ...
rather than principles.'" (quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945))).
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functional periods of limitations through the borrowing process thus entail
greater uncertainty and unpredictability than similar efforts in the legislative
branch.132 In any case, the task of selecting an appropriate state law analogy
requires courts to consider a host of factors and to render a "standardless,
discretionary judgment."'33  Justice Scalia and others have mounted
persuasive arguments against such open-ended balancing and in favor of a rule-
based jurisprudence.'34 One need not fully accept Scalia's critique of
balancing to agree that a rule makes more sense in this context; it was, after
all, the uncertainty associated with balancing that led Congress to substitute the
four-year rule of § 1658 for state law borrowing in the first place.
Having disposed of the principal objections to presumptive borrowing from
§ 1658, we now consider how the federal courts might implement such a
regime to achieve a tolerable degree of certainty and predictability without
disrupting settled expectations. We do not suggest that judges apply the four-
year period routinely and unthinkingly to every claim arising under the statutes
on the books as of December 1990. After all, the refusal of Congress itself to
address claims under preenactment statutes stemmed from its concern that the
retrospective alteration of established limitations periods might disrupt settled
expectations and do more harm than good.'3 5 The federal courts can address
these issues of settled expectations on a case-by-case basis within the
following guidelines. Courts should give the greatest respect to expectational
claims based upon limitations periods that the Supreme Court itself has
established in uniform rules borrowed from federal sources. Such nationally
uniform rules, settled at the highest level, achieve the goals of certainty and
uniformity and create expectation interests that deserve some measure of
respect.
Rules of timeliness that rely upon state law borrowing are somewhat less
deserving of continued application. Defendants, particularly those who limit
their activities to a single state, might make a plausible case for reasonable
reliance on rules that require the borrowing of state law limitations periods
shorter than four years. In many cases, however, the claim of reliance will not
withstand close scrutiny. So long as the defendants face a threat of multistate
litigation, and so long as one state's limitations period equals or exceeds four
years, the reliance claim is largely groundless. Moreover, so long as the proper
state law analogy has not been settled by a decision of the Supreme Court,
132. See Short, 908 F.2d at 1394-95 (Posner. I., concurnng) (rejecting an argument fur judicial
borrowing of state law limitations periods as unpredictable. expensive. and inescapably ,ubitrary and
arguing instead for a legislative solution).
133. Id. at 1394 (Posner, J., concurring).
134. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. 56 U CHI L R~v 1175 (1989). see
also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic AnalVst. 42 DUKi- L J 557. 571.77 (1992)
(arguing that rules can reduce enforcement costs in areas of repeated applicauon)
135. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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uncertainty about the proper characterization would appear to defeat many
claims of reliance.
The reliance interests of plaintiffs may deserve greater respect, at least in
circumstances where tolerably clear rules call for the application of limitations
periods longer than four years. A decision to shorten a relatively clear
limitations period would result in the unexpected dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim. Such unexpected dismissals end the case at a single stroke and thus
exact a heavy toll on plaintiffs. No similar burden ordinarily falls upon
defendants who face an unexpected lengthening of tolerably clear limitations
periods. Only in rare cases can defendants show that their ability to mount a
defense has been compromised by actions they took in reliance upon a shorter
limitations period.
Our essentially common sense view that the reliance interests of plaintiffs
deserve greater respect than those of defendants finds support in the rules of
constitutional law that govern the legality of legislative changes in the
applicable rules of timeliness. Generally speaking, defendants can
constitutionally attack a change in a rule of timeliness only where it threatens
to remove the bar of limitations after title to property has vested in them.
Lacking any claim to a "vested right" in repose, most defendants cannot
challenge legislative lengthening of limitations periods on constitutional
grounds. In contrast, legislative shortening of established limitations periods
may violate the due process rights of plaintiffs, at least to the extent that it
threatens to extinguish otherwise viable claims.
3 6
We do not see the Court's decision in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson37 as contrary to our proposed rule of providing relief
to plaintiffs from the application of an (unexpectedly short) four-year
limitations period. To be sure, the Gilbertson Court applied its own newly
established one-year-from-discovery, three-year-repose limitations period in
dismissing claims by plaintiffs with solid reliance claims and specifically
rejected an argument for equitable tolling.138 Yet the Court rejected the
argument for tolling on narrow grounds of inconsistency with the specific
terms of the three-year repose provision of the limitations period in
question. 39 Taken on its own terms, then, Gilbertson does not foreclose the
136. For general accounts of recent developments in the Court's management of issues of rctroactivity
in civil litigation, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731 (1991); and Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal
Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1997). See also David M. Mark.
Retroactivity of Statute of Limitations Rulings Under the Influence of Jim Beam, 29 IDAHo L. REV. 361
(1992-1993) (examining the influence of changes in the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence in the area of
limitations law).
137. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
138. See id. at 363-64.
139. See id. at 363.
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tolling of limitations periods, like the four-year period in § 1658, lacking
periods of repose.
Apart from the limited scope of the Gilbertson decision, the Court's own
thinking seemingly has evolved away from the approach adopted by the narrow
five-Justice majority in Gilbertson. The retroactive features of that decision not
only attracted a persuasive dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor,' but
also unsettled the expectations of a good many plaintiffs and eventually led to
the passage of new legislation by Congress seeking to reinstate claims unfairly
dismissed on its authority.' 4' All of these consequences of Gilbertson
returned to the Court itself in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, h1c.,112 a decision
that struck down one portion of the statutory fix as violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers.13 Plaut came down one week before oral arguments
in North Star Steel Co. v. Thomtas,'" the case the Court used to announce
its return to presumptive reliance on state limitations periods. We think it no
coincidence that the state law presumption in North Star Steel resulted in the
application of relatively generous state law limitations periods in preference to
a much shorter, six-month period drawn from federal sources. The Court's
unanimous rejection of an unsettlingly short federal limitations period in North
Star Steel may well have reflected an enhanced appreciation of the unfortunate
consequences, made evident in Plaut, of its rejection of the plaintiffs' plausible
arguments for equitable relief in Gilbertson. The Court's experience in
Gilbertson and Plaut suggests that many problems of unfair surprise that
otherwise arise from judicial changes in periods of limitations can be avoided
through the selection of the relatively generous four-year period of limitations
in § 1658.141
To illustrate how our approach might affect the selection of limitations
periods in future cases, we examine a series of recent Supreme Court decisions
and ask how the Court should address the issue of limitations periods in a
future case presenting similar questions. Consider first such decisions as
DelCostello,'46 Agency Holding Corp.,' 47 and Gilbertson.'- In each case,
140. See id. at 369 (O'Connor, J, dissenting)
141. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Pub L No 102.242. §
476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (codified at 15 U.SC § 78aa-I (1994))
142. 515 U.S. 211 (1995).
143. See id. at 225.
144. 515 U.S. 29 (1995).
145. Cf Curtis K. v. Sioux City Community Sch Dist. 895 F Supp 1197. 1220.21 (N D Iowa 1995)
(drawing support for the selection of a relatively long limitations period from the *'duration and rationale"
of § 1658).
146. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters. 462 U S 151. 169-72 (1983) fapplying a
nationally uniform six-month limitations penod to all hybrid claims for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement and breach of the duty of fair representation)
147. Agency Holding Corp. v Malley-Duff & Assocs. 483 U S 143. 156 (1987) (applying a Iour-yea
limitations period from the Clayton Act to civil RICO claims)
148. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigro%% v Gilbcrtson. 501 U S 350. 361.64 4 1991) 1appl ing
a limitations period, drawn from federal law, as the measure of the timeliness of insider trading claims
under the securities laws).
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the Court established a nationally uniform limitations period by borrowing
from a source elsewhere in federal law, and we see little cause to reconsider
the periods actually chosen in light of the new four-year period of § 1658. As
we noted above, such nationally uniform limitations periods eliminate any
incentive for forum shopping and achieve a significant degree of certainty and
ease of application. In addition, the affected groups have presumably adjusted
to these limitations periods or, as in the case of Gilbertson, have sought and
obtained corrective legislation from Congress. 49 Finally, prospective
defendants in claims governed by DelCostello were among those most likely
to have opposed legislative application of a general four-year period to claims
under preenactment statutes. Indeed, the report explaining the House's decision
to avoid retrospective application specifically mentions the six-month
limitations period of DelCostello to illustrate the kind of limitations period that
it wished to avoid unsettling.'50 Little would be gained, and much uncertainty
might result, from a decision to reopen these settled periods of limitations and
to apply a new four-year period.
In contrast to their treatment of claims already subject to nationally
uniform time limits, federal courts facing claims arising under the WARN Act
plant closing legislation should apply a uniform, federal four-year period
borrowed from § 1658. To be sure, the North Star Steel decision applied the
presumption in favor of state law borrowing and rejected the defendant
employer's proffered six-month federal limitations period. The Court, however,
found it unnecessary to provide a definitive characterization of the federal
claim at issue for state law borrowing purposes, noting only that the plaintiffs'
claims were timely under the two state law analogies proposed by the
parties. 5 ' It thus remains uncertain exactly how the federal courts will
characterize WARN Act plant closing claims. In addition, opportunities for
forum shopping and multistate variability abound in the plant closing area, and
with them comes a heightened need for a nationally uniform rule. For example,
the claims involved in North Star Steel itself arose from a plant closing in
Alabama, but the plaintiffs chose to file suit in Pennsylvania.' 52 These two
sources of variability-variability due to characterization questions and
variability in state law-will doubtless continue to confound lower court
judges and litigants and create incentives for forum shopping. Federal courts
could simplify matters considerably by adopting a uniform federal rule and
could do so without upsetting the expectations of defendants.
149. For a summary of the legislative response to Lampf, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 515
U.S. 211, 214-15 (1995), which reviewed the congressional attempt to reestablish old limitations periods
to protect the reliance interest of plaintiffs.
150. See supra text accompanying note 29.
151. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995).
152. See id. at 32.
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As the preceding paragraph suggests, the Court bears ultimate
responsibility for the content of the rules of federal common law that will fill
the gaps in § 1658. Pending further guidance from the Court, the lower
federal courts may legitimately borrow the four-year limitations period of
§ 1658 for use in some situations. Established law already permits the federal
courts, on occasion, to borrow from federal sources; North Star Steel explicitly
reaffirmed the viability of such borrowing even as it reaffirmed the primacy
of state law. While the lower federal courts might understandably hesitate to
move away from the North Star Steel presumption in favor of state law, they
nonetheless can find in particular cases that the North Star Steel presumption
has been rebutted and that federal law applies. The availability of a ready-
made four-year limitations period might conceivably expand the circumstances
in which the lower federal courts would find the presumption favoring state
law to have been overcome.
For a satisfactory solution to the problem of timeliness in the face of
congressional silence, however, guidance must come from the Supreme Court
itself. Our proposed use of the four-year period of § 1658 derives much of its
appeal from the promise of consistency, certainty, and ease of application.
Lower federal courts cannot achieve those goals through occasional borrowing
from § 1658. If some courts refuse to borrow from § 1658, the resulting inter-
district and inter-circuit variability would preserve the very uncertainty that our
proposal seeks to overcome. Only a decision by the Court, establishing a fairly
strong presumption in favor of borrowing from the uniform four-year period
of § 1658, can furnish the promise of national uniformity that this corner of
the law so obviously needs.
III. CONCLUSION
We share the concerns of those who have criticized the existing regime of
state law borrowing and those federal judges who understandably view the
borrowing process as largely wasted motion. The selection of a period of
limitations has an arbitrary quality and does not lend itself to the process of
reasoning by analogy. It is better to have a fixed period than an elegant body
of nuanced doctrine that yields considerably different answers depending on
the judge, the state, or the characterization of the federal claim. In a perfect
world, Congress would have addressed all these concerns when it took up the
limitations problem in 1990.
Many argue that efforts to solve the problem of borrowed limitations
should focus on securing further legislation from Congress. Such an avenue
certainly deserves exploration, but Congress may find it difficult to offer much
more guidance in this area. Congress responds to specific demands from
constituents and interest groups and has a great many issues on its plate. In our
world of scarce legislative resources, the press of other business may make it
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difficult for Congress to revisit the problem. The messy interest group
considerations that we explored in Part I help to explain why, despite the good
work of Professor Raven-Hansen and the recommendations of Professor
Norwood, Congress has made little progress in defining particular limitations
periods for rights of action under preenactment statutes. In truth, Congress may
have given all the help it can on these questions.
Instead of awaiting further legislative action, the federal courts can and
should solve their own problems by invoking their retained authority over the
content of the rules of federal common law that govern judge-made statutes of
limitations. The rule of state law borrowing developed as a rule of federal
common law; Congress did not impose it upon the courts. The federal courts
thus retain full control over the content of the body of common law and, under
the theory of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,153 can modify the rule
in light of changed circumstances. Indeed, circumstances certainly have
changed. State law borrowing began before the explosion of complex federal
statutes in the twentieth century, at a time when the federal courts had no
general or residual limitations period to apply to federal claims. The rule
makes far less sense today in a world where the process of drawing analogies
to state law has grown more complex, the connection of federal claims to
particular states has grown more tenuous, and the federal courts have available
to them a plausible four-year limitations period that can serve as an appropriate
measure of the timeliness of many federal civil actions. Nothing in the action
that Congress took in 1990 precludes the courts from reviewing the area in
which Congress did not act.
The nominal predicate for retaining the rule-the stare decisis concerns
embedded in the Court's construct of presumed legislative intent-simply
cannot support continued state law borrowing. Section 1658 now frames the
legislative process prospectively, and the courts are free and ought to be
willing to address the issue of limitations periods for actions arising under
preenactment statutes. Other reliance interests may deserve respect, such as the
interests of those who have come to rely upon clearly established judge-made
rules of timeliness. As we have shown, however, the federal courts can respect
such interests as occasional departures from a framework of presumptive
reliance upon limitations periods drawn from federal law or through the
application of principles of equitable tolling. Congress should not be held
solely responsible for cleaning up the preexisting mess. It has already made a
commendable house-cleaning in the area of limitations law.
153. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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